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COMPARATIVE FAULT AND INTENTIONAL TORTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,' the California Supreme Court abolished
contributory negligence and instituted a "pure" comparative negligence
system 2 under which liability for an injury is allocated between plaintiff
and defendant in direct proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to each party in bringing about the injury? Since Li, commentators have speculated on how far this equitable doctrine should be
extended.4 Although the Li opinion was limited to a negligence action
between one plaintiff and one defendant, the court recognized that the
comparative fault doctrine is potentially applicable to other situations.
However, the court declined to elaborate on these applications, prefer1. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
2. Id. at 827, 532 P.2d at 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 874. The Li court considered and rejected another form of comparative negligence called the "50 percent" rule, which apportions liability based on fault up to the point at which the plaintiff's fault is equal to or greater
than that of the defendant; at that point, plaintiff is precluded from further recovery. Id.
3. Id. at 828-29, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rpir. at 875. Following the Li decision, there
was uncertainty as to whether apportionment of damages was to be only among the named
parties to the action, or whether the term "parties" as used by the court was meant to include
all individuals causing the incident giving rise to plaintiff's injuries. It was suggested that
fault and liability should be apportioned among all the individuals responsible for the plaintiff's losses, even if those individuals were not before the court as named parties. Prosser,
Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 33-37 (1953); Braun, Contribution:A Fresh
Look, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 166, 202-03 (1975); Schwartz, Li v. Yellow Cab Company:A Survey of
CalJforniaPracticeUnder ComparativeNegligence, 7 PAC. L.J. 747, 763 (1976); CALIFORNIA
JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL, No. 14.91 (6th rev. ed. 1977). This doubt was resolved by American Motorcycle Ass'n. v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182
(1978), in which the court held that parties responsible for the plaintiff's injury but not
named in the complaint can be brought into the action by the cross-complaint of a named
defendant, and held liable for their proportionate negligence. Id. at 607, 578 P.2d at 917,
146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
4. See, e.g., Levine, Strict ProductsLiabilityand ComparativeNegligence: The Collision of
FaultandNo-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 337 (1977); Note, ProductsLiability, Comparative
Negligence, and the Allocation of DamagesAmong Multol(e Defendants, 50 S. CAL. L. REV.
73 (1976), suggesting that comparative fault should not be extended to strict product liability
actions.

Contra, V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 207-09 (1974) [hereinafter

cited as SCHWARTZ]. CAL. CIw. CODE § 1714 (West 1973) provides a very flexible guideline
for the assignment of liability:
Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury
occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his
property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care,
brought the injury upon himself.
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ring to deal with them on a case-by-case basis.5
Recently, the California Supreme Court has reiterated its determination to apply equitable principles to the allocation of tort liability by
extending the "comparative fault" concept, as it has come to be termed,
to other areas of tort law. In American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court,6 the court decided that in a negligence action involving two
or more defendants, liability should be apportioned according to the7
proportionate fault of each defendant, rather than on a pro rata basis.
In Daly v. GeneralMotors Corp.,8 the court expanded the comparative
fault doctrine to actions based on strict liability. Finally, in Safeway
Stores,Inc. v. Nest-Kart,9 the court ruled that comparative fault principles should be used to apportion damages between a negligent
tortfeasor and one liable under strict liability. However, the court has
not yet determined whether comparative fault principles should be extended to actions involving intentional misconduct. Eventually, such a
decision will be necessary, as current practices in intentional tort actions are inconsistent with the Li principle of comparative fault and its
subsequent expansion.
Presently, an intentional tortfeasor is held fully liable for his conduct, 10 regardless of the plaintiff's fault, I unless he can shift total liability back to the plaintiff by proving that the plaintiff "consented" to
his action. 2 Furthermore, in a California action involving one joint
5. 13 Cal. 3d at 826, 532 P.2d at 1241-42, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873-74.
6. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
7. To determine liability on a pro rata basis, the total liability is divided by the number of
defendants, and each defendant is held liable for an equal percentage of the total liability.
8. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
9. 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 481 (1965). In California, the measure of damages is established by CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1970), which provides:
For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages,
except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been
anticipated or not.
This statute is a variable guideline for damages, however, and courts are likely to impose
liability for extended damages in an intentional tort action. See generallyNote, The Tie That
Binds: Liabiliy ofIntentionalTort-FeasorsforExtended Consequences, 14 STAN. L. REv. 362
(1962).
11. It is generally held that negligence is no defense to an intentional tort. Bartosh v.
Banning, 251 Cal. App. 2d 378, 385, 59 Cal. Rptr. 382, 387 (1967) (assault); Van Meter v.
Bent Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 588, 593, 297 P.2d 644, 647 (1956) (fraud).
12. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1212 (1956). The presence of consent

is determined according to a reasonable person's interpretation of plaintiff's conduct. W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 101 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROS-

sER]. Consent is not, strictly speaking, a defense but rather acts to negative the commission
of an intentional tort. Id. at 101. But cf People v. Samuels, 250 Cal. App. 2d 501, 513, 58
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tortfeasor 13 guilty of intentional misconduct and another guilty of negligence, the negligent tortfeasor may have a cause of action for full im-

plied indemnity against the intentional tortfeasor. If the indemnity
action is successful, the intentional wrongdoer will ultimately be liable

for all of plaintiff's losses, regardless of the extent of the negligent defendant's fault.14 At present, in an action involving multiple defend-

ants where all defendants are guilty of intentional wrongdoing, the
courts refuse to inquire into their relative fault. In the latter situation,

if one tortfeasor pays all or any part of the judgment, he cannot force
the others to pay either the pro rata share associated with an action for
contribution, nor that part of the damages attributable to the other deCal. Rptr. 439, 447 (1967) ("[C]onsent of the victim is not generally a defense to assault or
battery, except in a situation involving ordinary physical contact or blows incident to
sports. .. ").
In special situations, other methods of shifting liability back to the plaintiff may be available. For instance, where the defendant's own interests, or those of the public, require him
to act as he does, and social policy is best served by permitting his actions, the defendant can
assert the defense of privilege and avoid some or all liability for his conduct. PROSSER,
supra note 12, at 98-99. Where force is necessary to prevent threatened harmful or offensive
bodily contact, or intentional or negligent confinement, the defendant can avoid liability
provided the force he used was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 108. Defense of
others may also be pleaded by the defendant in order to avoid liability for any injury sustained by the plaintiff. Id at 112-13. Defense of property and recapture of chattels may also
be invoked in order to shift any liability of the defendant back to the plaintiff. Id at 113,
117.
13. For the purposes of this discussion, "joint tortfeasors" will mean two or more individuals jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or
not a judgment has been rendered against some or all of them, and regardless of whether
their individual acts were successive, concurrent, or in concert.
14. Gardner v. Murphy, 54 Cal. App. 3d 164, 168-69, 126 Cal. Rptr. 302, 304 (1975). Full
implied indemnity is determined by the "active-passive negligence" test which is defined as
follows:
'The right of indemnity rests upon a difference between the primary and secondary
liability of two persons each of whom is made responsible by the law to an injured
party.. . . The difference between primary and secondary liability is not based on a
difference in degrees of negligence or on any doctrine of comparative negligence,--a
doctrine which, indeed, is not recognized by the common law .... It depends on a
difference in the characteror kind of the wrongs which cause the injury and in the
nature of the legal obligation owed by each of the wrongdoers to the injured person. . . . But the important point to be noted in all the cases is that secondary as distinguished from primary liability rests upon a fault that is imputed or constructive only,
being based on some legal relation between the parties, or arising from some positive
rule of common or statutory law or because of a failure to discover or correct a defect or
remedy a dangerous condition caused by the act of the one primarily responsible."
Sanders v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 65 Cal. App. 3d 630, 637-38, 135 Cal. Rptr.
555, 559 (1977)(quoting Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 325-26, 77 A. 2d 368,
370 (1951)). In Gardner,the court applied the active-passive test and concluded that the
intentional wrongdoer's liability was based on active misconduct, while the negligent
tortfeasor's misconduct was merely passive. 54 Cal. App. at 169, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
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fendants' intentional fault. 15
This comment will examine current decisions of the California
Supreme Court extending comparative fault principles beyond the Li

doctrine, and suggest that it would be consistent with this trend of expansion to extend comparative fault to actions based on intentional

misconduct.16
II.

THE EXPANSION OF COMPARATIVE FAULT AND INTENTIONAL
TORTS

Many of the former debates regarding the extension of Li's compar-

ative fault doctrine to actions involving non-negligent misconduct centered around a modification of the court's original decision. An earlier

version of the opinion, which fixed liability in relation to causal responsibility,

7

was amended to allocate liability in direct proportion to the

parties' relative fault,'" adding that the broad meaning of fault was limited to "'negligence' in the accepted legal sense."' 19
While Dean Prosser, upon whom the court relied heavily in the Li

decision, has suggested that "[i]n the legal sense, 'fault' has come to
mean no more than a departure from the conduct required of a man by
society for the protection of others... ,"0 some commentators con15. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(d) (West Supp. 1978) provides: "There shall be no right
of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally injured the injured person."
16. Such a policy would also be well within the flexible language of CAL. CIV. CODE §
1714 (West 1973); see note 4 supra.
17. A passage of the original opinion stated that 'fault and culpability are the quantities
to be measured, not mere physical causation." See Fleming, The Supreme Court of Californ/a 1974-75, Foreward"Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF.
L.REv. 239, 249 n.46 (1976).
18. 13 Cal. 3d at 813, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
19. Id at 813 n.6a, 532 P.2d at 1232 n.6a, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864 n.6a. The original Li
opinion was not so restricted. See note 17 supra.
20. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 18. Two states have adopted statutes which contain similar
definitions of fault and appear to be worded broadly enough to codify comparative fault as
between a plaintiff and defendant in cases of intentional misconduct. The Arkansas statute
provides in pertinent part:
27-1763. "Fault" defined.-The word "fault" as used in this Act. . . includes any
act, omission, conduct, risk assumed, or breach of warranty or breach of any legal duty
which is a proximate cause of any damages sustained by any party.
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 1765 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Similarly, the Maine legislature has adopted the following pertinent language:
156. Comparative negligence.
F"ault means negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives
rise to a liability in tort or would, apart from this section, give rise to the defense of
contributory negligence.
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tend that comparative fault concepts have no application outside an
action based on negligence.2 1 This latter position was soundly rejected
by the California Supreme Court in Daly v. General Motors Corp. 22
While recognizing the "theoretical and semantic distinctions" between
traditional negligence and the judicially formulated theory of strict liability,23 the court nevertheless extended comparative fault principles to
cases based on strict liability. 24 In so doing, the court commented: "If a
more just result follows from the expansion of comparative principles,
we have no hesitancy in seeking it, mindful always that the fundamental and underlying purpose of Li was to promote the equitable allocation of loss among all parties legally responsible in proportion to their
ME. REv. STAT. tit. 14, § 156 (Cum.Supp. 1977-1978).
While the title "Comparative negligence" appears to preclude the application of the
Maine statute to allow apportionment of damages where the defendant has engaged in intentional wrongdoing, the wording of the statute addressing the application of comparative
fault principles is not in terms of negligence, but solely in terms of fault, which as defined in
the statute can clearly encompass intentional torts. A Maine commentator has stated that
"'Comparative negligence' is syonymous with 'damage apportionment' and it is unfortunate
that the former term has been retained when the latter defines the concept well." The author
then used the two terms interchangeably in his discussion of the statute. Note, Comparative
Negligence: Some New Problemsfor the Maine Courts, 18 ME. L. REv. 65, 67 (1966).
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he name given to an act by way of designation or description... cannot change the
plain import of its words. If the words are plain, they give meaning to the act, and it is
neither the duty nor the privilege of the courts to enter speculative fields in search of a
different meaning.
. . . [W hen words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression of
the legislative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from by considerations
drawn from titles or designating names ...
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917).
In a similar vein, while the UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1(b) (1977) does not
include intentional torts, apparently because "[s]tatutes and decisions have not applied the
comparative fault principle to them. . . ." The comment to that section states that a court
"determining that the general principle should apply at common law to a case before it of an
intentional tort is not precluded from the holding by the Act." Id (Commissioner's Comment).
It is therefore suggested that the Li court's dicta suggesting that it would not extend comparative fault to intentional torts, 13 Cal. 3d at 826, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873, is
inconsistent with the legal definition of fault as suggested by Prosser and adopted by two
state legislatures.
21. See, e.g., Levine, StrictProductsLiabili&y and ComparativeNegligence: The Collision of
Fault and No-Fault, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 337, 351-56 (1977); Note, ProductsLiabilit,
ComparativeNegligence, and the Allocation of DamagesAmong Multile Defendants, 50 S.
CAL. L. REv. 73 (1976).
22. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
23. Id at 734, 575 P.2d at 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
24. Id at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
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fault." 2 Since the court had little difficulty holding that loss should
be equitably apportioned in strict liability cases, actions not traditionally based on "fault," 26 and rejected the restrictive definition of the Li
court,27 it would be consistent to apply comparative fault principles to
an action which is based on fault, albeit intentional fault.
.4. Apportionment of Fault between PlaintifandDefendant
Under certain circumstances, an individual may be negligent in permitting an act or omission which he should realize involves an unreasonable risk' of intentional, or even criminal harm to others,28 i e., the

failure to foresee and guard against the intentional misconduct of a
third party where a reasonably prudent person would do so. 29 This
situation specifically deals with foreseeable intentional harm; therefore,
the legal principles applicable to third party intentional harm could
also be applied as between a negligent plaintiff and an intentional tortfeasor.
In the third party cases, various factors are considered before con-

cluding an individual was negligent in contributing to intentional misconduct. Factors balanced in this approach3° include the known
character, past conduct and tendencies of the person who intentionally
caused the harm, the temptation or opportunity the situation may afford for such misconduct, the gravity of the harm which may result, the
burden of the precautions which the actor would be required to take,3 '
and the importance of the right which the actor is asserting by his con25. Id at 737, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
26. "We think that apportioning tort liability is sound, logical and capable of wider application than to negligence cases alone." Id at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390. In
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697, 700 (1963), the California Supreme Court established strict products liability as a separate cause of action not based upon negligence, stating "[a] manufacturer is stricty liable in
tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection
for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." (emphasis added).
27. See notes 17-19 supra and the accompanying text.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965).
29. "[Olne doing an act which a reasonably prudent person would not do, or failing to do
something which a reasonably prudent person would do, actuated by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs is guilty of negligence." Travelers Indem. Co. v. Titus, 265 Cal. App. 2d 515, 519, 71 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (1968).

30.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 302B, Comment f (1965).

31. The burden of guarding against another's intentional wrongdoing usually outweighs
the risk of such misconduct. Feezer & Favour, Intervening Crime and Liability for
Negligence, 24 MiNN. L. REv. 635, 648 (1940); PROSSER, supra note 12, at 174.
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duct.3 2 Under this formulation of negligence, defendants have been
held liable to a plaintiff intentionally injured by a third person, where
the negligent defendant created a situation "inviting" intentional injury
to the plaintiff, and the risk of the intentional injury was sufficiently
foreseeable.33
However, under current law, a negligent plaintiff who "invites" an
intentional injury can escape responsibility for his actions, as traditionally, a plaintiffs recovery has not been reduced by his own negligence
in an intentional tort action.34 Thus, at present, in cases of foreseeable
intentional harm, the law determines liability solely on the status of an
individual as a plaintiff or defendant.3 This result appears to be patently inconsistent with the Li holding that both plaintiff and defendant
should bear the burden of liability according to their relative fault.
Where an individual creates an unreasonable risk that someone will be
injured by subsequent intentional misconduct, the fact that it is the
same negligent individual who invited the conduct that is injured
should not relieve him of all liability for his negligence.
One rationale for the reluctance of the courts to reduce a negligent
plaintiffs recovery in an intentional tort action is that negligence and
32. In determining the standard [of care] to be required, there are two chief matters for
consideration. The first is the magnitude of the risk to which other persons are exposed,
while the second is the importance of the object to be attained by the dangerous form of
activity. The reasonableness of any conduct will depend upon the proportion between
these two elements. To expose others to danger for a disproportionate object is unreasonable, whereas an equal risk for a better cause may lawfully be run without negligence.
P. FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 385 (12th ed. 1966). See also PROSSER, supra
note 12, at 425; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 473, Comment d (1965).
33. See generally Hergenrether v. East, 61 Cal. 2d 440, 393 P.2d 164, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4
(1964); Murray v. Wright, 166 Cal. App. 2d 589, 333 P.2d 111 (1958); Richardson v. Ham, 44
Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955). It has also been noted:
It cannot fairly be said as a matter of law, and should not be categorically laid down,
that crime is entirely unexpectable in any situation where the stage set by the original
wrongdoer's negligence affords an opportunity for crime to any person with criminal
impulse who may happen to appear on the scene.
Feezer & Favour, Intervening Crime andLiabilityforNegligence,24 MINN. L. REv. 634, 648
(1940).
34. See note I1 supra and the accompanying text.
35. The courts are not reluctant to impose full liability upon a negligent defendant when
the negligent conduct was the failure to foresee and guard against another's intentional tort
resulting in injury to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Hergenrether v. East, 61 Cal. 2d 440, 393 P.2d
164, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1964); Murray v. Wright, 166 Cal. App. 2d 589, 333 P.2d 111 (1958). It
should be noted that these cases involved intentional tortfeasors who could not be located
for suit. If the intentional tortfeasor can be found, the negligent tortfeasor may attempt to
shift all his liability to the intentional tortfeasor-defendant through indemnity. See text accompanying notes 79-84, infra. However, with respect to the plaintiff, the negligent
tortfeasor remains jointly and severally liable.
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intentional wrongdoing are said to be different types of fault, as opposed to different points on a continuum of fault, and that they are
therefore not comparable.36 This argument is no longer compelling
after Daly, where the court rejected the argument that a plaintiff's negligence should not reduce his recovery in a products liability case because the two types of "fault" involved, negligence and strict liability,
were of different types which could not be compared. 7 After noting
that contributory negligence is probably a misnomer since it lacks an
essential element of traditional negligence, namely, a duty of care owed
to another,3 8 the court refused to "permit plaintiff's own conduct relative to the product to escape unexamined, and as to that share of plaintiffs damages which flows from his own fault we discern no reason of
policy why it should, following Li, be borne by others. ' 39 The court
accordingly ordered that the plaintiffs and manufacturer's fault be
compared in order to properly apportion liability.40
A second rationale for imposing full liability on an intentional
tortfeasor is that of deterrence.4 1 Thus, imposing full liability upon an
intentional tortfeasor may serve both as a punishment and a deterrence
of similar conduct in the future. However, the deterrent effect of such a
practice is speculative at best.42 Furthermore, the principle underlying
all tort law is compensation, 43 not punishment. When Li introduced
comparative negligence, the compensatory principle was reinforced;
neither plaintiff nor defendant are "punished" by being held liable for
damages not attributable to their fault.
36. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 426.
37. 20 Cal. 3d at 734-37, 575 P.2d at 1167-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385-87.
38. Id at 735, 575 P.2d at 1167-68, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
39. d at 737, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
40. Id at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
41. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 23. ("The 'prophylactic' factor of preventing future harm
has been quite important in the field of torts.") The law is also concerned with deterring
others from similar misconduct. Id at 9.
42. Note, The Tie That Binds. Liability of Intentional Tort-Feasors for Extended
Consequences, 14 STAN. L. Rnv. 362, 364-65 (1962).
43. Prosser, ComparativeNegligence, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 1,7 (1953)("The civil action for a
tort.. . is commenced and maintained by the injured person himself, and its purpose is to
compensate him for the damage he has suffered, at the expense of the wrongdoer.") See
generally 1 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 478-81 (1906), indicating
that in determining a plaintiffs recovery compensation is the major goal, but that punishment may be a factor in the imposition of either compensatory or punitive damages. However, one commentator has suggested that while compelling a defendant to pay the amount
of plaintiff's loss is, from the plaintiffs view, compensation, it is punishment as viewed from
the defendant's position. P. FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 103 (12th ed.
1966).
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While there may be a place for punishment in a civil suit," such

punishment is provided by punitive damages, and not by the imposi-

tion of compensatory damages. 45 In California, punitive damages re-

quire proof that the defendant acted with "oppression, fraud or malice"
in perpetrating his misconduct. 4 6 The stricter requirements for impos-

ing punishment for the sake of example in a civil action emphasize that
while punishment may be appropriate in some instances, it is not to be
confused with the main tort goal of compensating the plaintiff for damages caused by the fault of another.4 7 Thus, punishment in the form of

holding an intentional tortfeasor liable for compensatory damages not
44. The validity of awarding punitive damages in a civil suit has been questioned. See,
e.g., Note, Exemplary Damagesin the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517 (1957); Note The
Imposition ofPunishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisalof Punitive Damages,41 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1158 (1966).
45. 1 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 478-79 (1906).
46. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970) provides:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in
addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by
way of punishing the defendant.
This statute has traditionally been interpreted to mean that punitive damages are not justified unless the defendant's conduct is intentional. G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Ct., 49
Cal. App. 3d 22, 31, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 224 (1975); Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 172, 116 P.
530, 543 (1911). However, there was dissatisfaction with this requirement, and the Searle
court suggested that a different standard be applied: "We suggest conscious disregardof
safqy as an appropriate description of the animus malus which may justify an exemplary
damage award when nondeliberate injury is alleged." 49 Cal. App. 3d at 32, 122 Cal. Rptr.
at 225.
The court in Seimon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 67 Cal. App. 3d 600, 607-09, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 787, 791-92 (1977) applied the Searle "conscious disregard" test where defendant railroad had continued to maintain a crossing in a dangerous manner after being put on notice
of the possibility of harm resulting from the dangerous condition. The court, after analyzing
the defendant's conduct under the conscious disregard of safety theory, reversed the trial
court's nonsuit on the issue of punitive damages and ordered a retrial. Id. at 608-09, 136
Cal. Rptr. at 792. Therefore, it now appears that in California, punitive damages can be
awarded for what used to be classified as a cause of action for negligence. Thus, an expanded definition of malice has been created by the courts which permits recovery of punitive damages based upon conduct which lies somewhere between gross negligence or
recklessness and intentional misconduct.
47. In practice, however, the distinction between compensation and punishment is often
blurred. For instance, a nineteenth century Wisconsin case was tried three times in three
different counties, resulting in three identical verdicts. Two of the verdicts included exemplary damages and one verdict was based solely on compensatory damages. 1 T. STREET,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 480 n.8 (1906)(citing Bass v. Chicago & Northwestem Ry., 36 Wis. 450 (1874)(verdict for plaintiff of $4,500 under instruction allowing punitive
damages); Bass v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 39 Wis. 636 (1876)(verdict for plaintiff of
$4,500 under instruction allowing only compensatory damages); Bass v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 42 Wis. 654 (1877)(verdict for plaintiff of $4,500 under instruction allowing
punitive damages)).
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attributable to his fault is not a proper method of furthering society's
interest in reducing the number of intentional torts.
As noted previously, the intentional tortfeasor is relieved of liability
when the plaintiff's conduct is found to constitute consent; 48 in such a
case, the plaintiff is totally precluded from recovery. Since such consent and assumption of the risk, in the context of a negligence action,
are analogous,4 9 it is instructive to examine the treatment of the assumption of the risk doctrine under recent decisions as well as the effect
of this treatment in determining liability.
Prior to Li, negligence actions were based on an all-or-nothing approach: the defendant was totally liable unless he could shift liability
back to the plaintiff through an absolute defense."0 One method of accomplishing this result was to show that the plaintiff had assumed the
risk of the defendant's conduct."' In Li, the court incorporated the assumption of the risk doctrine into the comparative fault evaluation in
order to determine proportionate liability. 2 Thereafter, the Daly court
noted that if the Li principle of assumption of the risk were not followed in a products liability case, the same conduct which would
merely reduce a plaintiffs recovery in a negligence suit would completely bar his recovery under a strict liability theory. 3
This anomalous result, rejected by the Day court, will continue to be given effect in intentional tort actions if the court does not
further extend comparative fault principles. Under existing California
48. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
49. Valencia v. San Jose Scavenger Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 469, 473, 69 P.2d 489, 482 (1937);
PROSSER, supra note 12, at 101; 1 CAL. JUR. 3d, Actions § 24 (1972).
50. The contributory negligence doctrine, which was in effect in California until the Li
court adopted comparative negligence, was an all-or-nothing approach to determining liability. Any negligence on the part of a plaintiff would bar recovery where it was to some
degree a proximate or immediate cause of plaintiffs injury. Straten v. Spencer, 52 Cal. App.
98, 103-05, 197 P. 540, 542-43 (1921). Thus, the plaintiff could either recover all his losses or
none of them; apportionment of damages was not allowed. Id at 106-07, 197 P. at 543-44.
51. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 440. Basically, the defense of assumption of the risk negated any duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Id Other methods of shifting
total liability back to the plaintiff included proving that the plaintiff had contributed to his
own injuries, thus invoking the contributory negligence doctrine to bar recovery. See, e.g.,
Gyerman v. United States Lines Co., 7 Cal. 3d 488, 498 P.2d 1043, 102 Cal. Rptr. 795
(1972)(finding plaintiffs negligence did not proximately cause his injuries); Robinson v.
Harrington, 195 Cal. App. 2d 126, 15 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1961) (plaintiffs contributory negligence a proximate cause of his injuries). Under the doctrine known as "last clear chance,"
where both the plaintiff and defendant were negligent, the plaintiff could shift total liability
back to the defendant by proving that the defendant had an opportunity to avoid injuring
the plaintiff despite the plaintiffs negligence. PROSSER, Supra note 12, at 428.
52. 13 Cal. 3d at 825, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
53. 20 Cal. 3d at 738, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387.

19781

COMPARATIVE FA UL T

law, if a defendant's conduct is found to be intentional, what is termed

assumption of the risk in a negligence action totally precludes a plaintiff's recovery because it will be said that he "consented." If, on the
other hand, defendant is found liable of conduct somewhat less serious

than intentional wrongdoing, liability will be apportioned according to
the relative fault of plaintiff and defendant. Such a system, encourag-

ing "adroit pleading and selection of theories" 4 can easily result in
injustice, especially since the distinction between negligence, 55 gross
negligence,5 6 and intent57 is often very difficult to make.58 Indeed, even
54. Id
55. For a definition of negligence, see note 29 supra.
56. Gross negligence has been repeatedly defined in the California cases as: "the want of
slight diligence," "an entire failure to exercise care, or the exercise of so slight a degree of
care as to justify the belief that there was an indifference to the things and welfare of others,"
and "that want of care which would raise a presumption of the conscious indifference to
consequences." People v. Pfeffer, 224 Cal. App. 2d 578, 580, 36 Cal. Rptr. 838, 839 (1964)
(quoting People v. Costa, 40 Cal. 2d 160, 166, 252 P.2d 1, 5 (1953)). In California, gross
negligence gives rise to harsher legal consequences than ordinary negligence. Donnelly v.
Southern Pac. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 863, 871, 118 P.2d 465, 469 (1941).
57. "[Willfulness and intent denote deliberation or design... ." G. D. Searle & Co. v.
Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 31, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 224 (1975).
58. Special terms have been devised to account for conduct deviating from the standard
definitions of negligence, gross negligence, and intent. For example, the term "wanton and
wilful misconduct" "'implies the intentional doing of something either with knowledge, express or implied, that serious injury is a probable, as distinguished from a possible, result, or
the intentional doing of an act with a wanton and reckless disregard of its consequences."'
Christian v. Bolls, 7 Cal. App. 3d 408,418, 86 Cal. Rptr. 545, 551 (1970)(quoting Williams v.
Carr, 68 Cal. 2d 579, 584, 440 P.2d 505, 509, 68 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309 (1968)). While such
conduct has been equated with "gross negligence," Mahoney v. Corralejo, 36 Cal. App. 3d
966, 973, 112 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64 (1970), other courts have said such conduct is "[something]
more than mere negligence, however gross, but less than the conventional intentional
tort. . . ." Kroiss v. Butler, 129 Cal. App. 2d 550, 556, 277 P.2d 873, 877 (1954). The Li
court cited with approval jury instructions defining wilful or wanton misconduct as "intentional wrongful conduct, done either with knowledge, express or implied, that serious injury
to another will probably result, or with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible
results." 13 Cal. 3d at 825 n.19, 532 P.2d at 1241 n.19, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873 n.19. The Li
court further indicated that comparative negligence may be applied in an action involving
such misconduct. Id at 826, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873. However, an appellate
court indicated wilful misconduct is more like intentional misconduct. Goldman v. House,
93 Cal. App. 2d 572, 575, 209 P.2d 639, 641 (1949). It is generally held that the consequences
and legal rules pertaining to intentional torts may be applied in actions involving wanton
and wilful misconduct. Mahoney v. Corralejo, 36 Cal. App. 3d 966, 973, 112 Cal. Rptr. 61,
64 (1974); Olea v. Southern Pac. Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 261, 265-66, 77 Cal. Rptr. 332, 335
(1969).
Furthermore, now that punitive damages can apparently be awarded for misconduct done
with conscious disregard of others' safety, see note 46 supra, there seems to be even less
reason for applying comparative negligence in an action involving "conscious disregard of
safety," a type of conduct considered so onerous as to support an award of punitive damages, while denying the application of comparative fault principles to an action involving
intentional misconduct.
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the courts have differed as to the proper characterization of a defend-

ant's actions based on the same factual situation. 9 This problem is
exacerbated in a system which allows comparison not only of ordinary
negligence, but of gross negligence. 60 Gross negligence is so hard to
distinguish from intentional misconduct that one commentator has suggested renaming it "negligent wilful conduct" in order to encompass
the varying judicial interpretations of this kind of behavior.6 '
The extension of comparative fault principles to intentional tort actions may serve to allow recovery in situations where current practices
deny it, even if a plaintiff's conduct is not found to constitute consent.
For example, in an action for intentional misrepresentation, the plaintiff is required to prove that his reliance upon the misrepresentation
In short, where the conduct in question approaches intentional misconduct, the courts
have not dealt with it in a consistent manner, even in their definitions. However, once the
courts have decided which category of conduct best fits the behavior, the arbitrary nature of
that decision is forgotten, and the consequences of the classification, le., the application of
comparative negligence and punitive damages, follows automatically. See, e.g., Billingsley
v. Westrac Co., 365 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 1966)(construing Arkansas comparative negligence statute).
59. It is not uncommon for cases tried on a negligence cause of action to be reversed on
appeal because the appellate court found the defendant's conduct to be intentional. See,
e.g., Schulze v. Kleeber, 10 Wis. 2d 540, 103 N.W.2d 560 (1960)(mayor and police sued for
injuries sustained when police officer, at mayor's direction, ejected plaintiff from city council
meeting); Munoz v. Olin, 76 Cal. App. 3d Adv. Sh. 85, 142 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1977), hearing
granted,No. 2-50451 (Feb. 16, 1978) (comparative fault principles applied to case in which
decedent was killed by police officer, appellate court found officer's action intentional).
Complaints have also been amended midway through trial to change the basis of the
action from an intentional tort action to a negligence action. See, e.g., Celmer v. Quarberg,
56 Wis. 2d 581, 203 N.W.2d 45 (1973). And sometimes there is dissent among the justices as
to whether conduct should be classified as negligent or intentional. See, e.g., Kagel v. Brugger, 19 Wis. 2d 1, 119 N.W.2d 394 (1963).
60. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has abolished the category of gross negligence; gross
negligence is now treated as ordinary negligence under the Wisconsin comparative negligence system. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 17-18, 114 N.W.2d 105, 113 (1962). Commentators have urged that this approach be adopted. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 108;
Posner, Reeslund & Williams, ComparativeNegligence in California:Some Legislative Solutions-PartII, L.A. Daily J. Rep., Aug. 26, 1977, at 5. The Li court noted that such arguments were persuasive. 13 Cal. 3d at 825-26, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873. In the
past, some California courts required a plaintiff to foresee and guard against gross negligence. See, eg., Taylor v. Volfi, 86 Cal. App. 244, 247, 260 P. 927, 928 (1927). But see,
Mahoney v. Corralejo, 36 Cal. App. 3d 966, 973, 112 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64 (1974), stating that
contributory negligence will not be applied when defendant's conduct is grossly negligent,
although such conduct is included in the general term "negligence."
61. SCHWARTZ, supra note 4, at 105. This combination of terms is designed to accomodate "wilful negligence" within comparative negligence. However, California courts have
long viewed the two concepts as having separate and distinct meanings. Giminez v. Rissen,
12 Cal. App. 2d 152, 160, 55 P.2d 292, 297 (1936).
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was justifiable before any recovery is allowed.62 While it has been observed that this practice is analogous to denying recovery due to contributory negligence,63 the courts and commentators have generally
refused to admit that they are denying recovery for an intentional tort
due to the plaintiffs own negligence. Even if the plaintiff in an intentional misrepresentation action was negligent, the fact that he was injured by intentional misconduct remains.
It would appear to be more consistent with Li and the compensation
goal of tort law to require that the damages recovered by a negligent
plaintiff in an intentional tort action be reduced in proportion to the
plaintiff's fault. In reality, due to the weighing of factors, such as the
foreseeability of risk and the burden of taking precautions, which is
required prior to a finding that the plaintiff was negligent, there are
probably few times in which a plaintiffs recovery would be substantially reduced, if at all, due to his own negligence. Furthermore, if the
plaintiff could prove malice, oppression or fraud on the part of the defendant, the reduction in compensatory damages would be more than
offset by the recovery of punitive damages. Therefore, by extending
comparative fault to include intentional torts, the courts would not only
retain consistency I in the development of comparative fault but would
also obviate the inequities which result from restricting the definition of
"fault" to "negligent fault."6
B. Between Intentional Tortfeasors
As noted above, California Code of Civil Procedure section 875(d)
specifically precludes the use of contribution as a means of apportion-

ing liability between two or more intentional tortfeasors.66 In contrast,

comparative fault concepts have been expanded under the same statute
to encompass actions basing liability on comparative fault among negligent defendant tortfeasors in a manner similar to the developments in
actions apportioning liability between a negligent plaintiff and defendant. In American Motorcycle Alssociation v. Superior Court,67 the California Supreme Court held that damages must be apportioned among
62. Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. 2d 409,414, 115 P.2d 977, 980 (1941); PROSSER, supranote 12,
at 715-16. See also Note, Deceit, 16 VAL. L. Rav. 749, 762-64 (1930).
63. See authorities cited note 62 supra.
64. The Li court expressed concern that liability be assigned on a "just and consistent
basis." 13 Cal. 3d at 812, 532 P.2d at 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
65. See note 20 supra.
66. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
67. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
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negligent tortfeasors according to their respective fault,68 and in
Safeway Stores,Inc. v. Nest-Kart,69 the court applied the doctrine in an

action involving a negligent defendant and a defendant liable on the
basis of products liability.7 °
Both of those decisions used the doctrine of "partial indemnity" to
by-pass the California contribution statute mandating that liability between non-intentional tortfeasors be apportioned on a pro rata basis.
In altering that aspect of indemnity which totally shifts liability, the
71
American Motorcycle court followed the lead of a New York decision
which first enunciated the concept of "partial indemnity. ' 72 That court
has since reiterated its decision to permit "apportionment of damages
among joint or concurrent tort-feasors regardless of the degree or nature of the concurring fault, ' 73 prompting the New York legislature to
rewrite its contribution statutes to allow the application of comparative
74
fault principles in the context of a cause of action for contribution
rather than requiring resort to the rather artificial doctrine of partial
indemnity. Thus, if the California courts choose to follow the progressive New York attitude, partial indemnity will undoubtedly be expanded to effect apportionment of liability based on fault among all
tortfeasors, regardless of the characterization of their wrongdoing as
negligent or intentional.
It is quite possible that the court will indeed continue in the footsteps
of New York in light of the ease with which the California Supreme
Court circumvented a similar contribution statute and years of case law
to apply comparative fault to apportion damages among a negligent
68. Id at 599, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
69. 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978).
70. Id at 332, 579 P.2d at 446, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
71. In Dole v. Dow Chem. Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1972), the New York Supreme Court contravened contribution statutes similar to those
currently in effect in California by formulating the "partial indemnity" concept. For the
legislative response to this decision, see note 74 infra. It is interesting to note that shortly
before the American Motorcycle decision, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted equitable apportionment between defendant tortfeasors in a series of three cases, even though Illinois has
not yet adopted comparative negligence between plaintiff and defendant. See Skinner v.
Reed-Prentice Div., 70 IlM.
2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977); Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 11. 2d
41, 374 N.E.2d 455 (1977); International Harvester Co., 7011. 2d 47, 374 N.E.2d 458 (1977).
72. 20 Cal. 3d at 597-98, 578 P.2d at 911, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
73. Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 29, 236 N.E.2d 241, 243, 334
N.Y.S.2d 851, 854 (1972).
74. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAW §§ 1401-1404 (McKinney 1976). The sponsor's memo to these
sections notes that the changes in the contribution statutes to provide for apportionment of
damages were a logical outgrowth of the judicial decisions.
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and strictly liable defendant.7" While the California Supreme Court

has noted that the goal of both indemnity7 6 and contribution77 is "the
equitable distribution of loss among multiple tortfeasors,"' T the two

concepts have historically been applied in different situations. Since
the rationale underlying the application of these two principles to defendant tortfeasors is different, each will be discussed separately.
1. Indemnity and Comparative Fault

Indemnity originally developed as an equitable exception to the
common law rule disallowing contribution between negligent
tortfeasors; 79 where one tortfeasor was more culpable than the other,

the more culpable party was made to bear the loss. 0 However, because
judicial practices at that time were based on an all-or-nothing approach

rather than apportionment, indemnity developed as a means of shifting
total liability.81
California adopted the practice of applying indemnity to allow a less
negligent defendant to shift total liability to a more negligent one,3 2
and similarly a negligent defendant could shift total liability to an intentional defendant.8 3 This procedure was justified by reference to the
difference in the character of the fault involved. 4 By allowing a negli-

gent tortfeasor to escape all consequences of his own acts through indemnity, the California courts in effect gave him the same status as a

negligent plaintiff in an intentional tort action. It is questionable
whether this practice is based on sound social policy. 8 First, the negli75. For a discussion tracing the history of this development, see Safeway v. Nest-Kart, 21
Cal. 3d 322, 327-32, 579 P.2d 441, 443-46, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 552-55 (1978).
76. Indemnity has traditionally been used to shift the entire loss from one tortfeasor to
another, rather than to effect an apportionment of the loss. Leflar, Contributionand Indemnit, between Tortfeasors,81 U. PA. L. Rav. 130, 131 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Leflar].
77. Contribution is a method of dividing damages between multiple tortfeasors, traditionally calculated by dividing the total recovery by the number of defendants found liable. See,
e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 876(a) (West Supp. 1978)("The pro rata share of each
tortfeasor judgment debtor shall be determined by dividing the entire judgment equally
among all of them.").
78. 20 Cal. 3d at 592, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
79. Id at 593, 578 P.2d at 908, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
80. Id at 594, 578 P.2d at 908, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
81. Id
82. See, e.g., Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 382, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301,
309 (1962); Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy, 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 75, 4 Cal. Rptr. 379, 383
(1960) (quoting Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 325-26, 77 A.2d 368, 370
(1951)).
83. Gardner v. Murphy, 54 Cal. App. 3d 164, 126 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1975).
84. Id at 168, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 304; see generally cases cited note 82 supra.
85. "Is there any sound public policy which justifies a rule of law which exculpates from
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gent tortfeasor, since uninjured, can hardly assert the tort goal of compensation on his own behalf. Second, the courts are not reluctant to
hold a negligent defendant fully liable for a plaintiff's losses should the
intentional tortfeasor be judgment-proof. 6 Finally, as discussed previously, shifting full liability is not a proper method of punishing the
intentional tortfeasor and deterring future misconduct in the context of
a civil action. 7 Indeed, in Safeway, when applying comparative fault
between a negligent tortfeasor and one liable in strict liability, the California Supreme Court noted that although the theories of liability may
be different, "fairness and other tort policies, such as deterrence of dangerous conduct or encouragement of accident-reducing behavior, frequently calls for an apportionment of liability among multiple
tortfeasors." s Referring to Daly, the Safeway court reiterated that perceived different types of "fault" will not preclude the courts from apportioning liability on a comparative basis, 9 and noted that a system in
which such a comparison could not be made would lead to "bizarre,
and indeed irrational, consequences."90 Similar unreasonable results
can now occur and will continue to occur in intentional tort actions
unless the court allows apportionment of damages between negligent
and intentional defendants. Under the present system, even a grossly
negligent tortfeasor can escape all liability if he can convince the court
that his co-defendant's misconduct was "intentional," thus placing
himself in a better position than a defendant found to have been negligent in the ordinary meaning of that term, who is forced to bear his
proportionate share of the liability merely because his co-defendant's
conduct was also only negligent.
There are indications that the California courts may be less willing to
hold an intentional tortfeasor fully liable when a negligent tortfeasor
liability an admitted wrongdoer merely because a second wrongdoer has intervened and
assisted in causing the plaintiff's harm?" Eldredge, Culpable Intervention As Superseding
Cause, 86 U. PA. L. Rav. 121, 129 (1937).
86. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976)(plaintiffs in wrongful death case had cause of action against regents and
psychotherapists where a dangerously violent patient threatened to kill a specific individual,
and despite their knowledge, defendants failed to warn the intended victim); Hergenrether v.
East, 61 Cal. 2d 440, 393 P.2d 164, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1964)(employees and employer held
liable for plaintiffi' damages where employees negligently left keys in two-ton truck which
was subsequently stolen by an unidentified third party who negligently caused the truck to
collide with plaintiffs' vehicle).
87. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
88. 21 Cal. 3d at 330, 579 P.2d at 445, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
89. Id at 331, 579 P.2d at 446, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
90. Id at 332, 579 P.2d at 446, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
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also contributed to plaintiff's loss. In Gardnerv. Murhy,9 1 a negligent

tortfeasor sought indemnity against an allegedly intentional tortfeasor.

Although the court allowed the cause of action,92 it noted that questions of contribution were involved. While the court declined to rule

on those issues because they had not been argued by counsel, it expressly stated that this result did not bar the intentional tortfeasor from

bringing a later action for contribution. 93 The Gardner court also noted
that if "exact justice" were to be done, apportionment of liability based
on fault would be allowed between all joint tortfeasors in a tort action.94 If it would be more equitable to apportion damages between
negligent and intentional joint tortfeasors, there is little logic in a rule
prohibiting an intentional tortfeasor from forcing another intentional
tortfeasor, also at fault, to bear a proportionate amount of the liability.
2.

Contribution and Comparative Fault

Traditionally, apportionment of liability between joint tortfeasors
has been accomplished through the doctrine of contribution.95 Accordingly, when the California legislature dealt with the apportionment of

liability between two or more tortfeasors, it did so by enacting contribution statutes.96 California Code of Civil Procedure section 875(d)

flatly prohibits any contribution between intentional joint tortfeasors, 97
incorporating the common law practice98 which is still the rule in a
majority of jurisdictions.99

However, in light of the California

Supreme Court's statement that "the existing contribution statutes do
91. 54 Cal. App. 3d 164, 126 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1975).
92. Id at 168-69, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
93. Ad at 166 n.2, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 302-03 n.2.
94. Id
95. 20 Cal. 3d at 592, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
96. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880 (West Supp. 1978).
97. See note 15 supra.
98. The case credited with formulating this practice is Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng.
Rep. 1337 (1799), which involved the intentional tort of conversion. PROSSER, supra note 12,
at 305.
99. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 308. The UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS AcT § 1 (1939, revised 1955) defined joint tortfeasors as "two or more persons
jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not
judgment has been recovered against all or some of them." Section 2 of the 1939 Act establishes a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors, which the Commissioner's Note to that
section states is not confined to negligent tortfeasors.
The 1939 Act was substantively adopted in only eight states: Arkansas (1941); Delaware
(1949); Hawaii (1941); Maryland (1941); New Mexico (1947); Pennsylvania (1951); Rhode
Island (1940); and South Dakota (1945). UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
AcT (1955 Revision)(Commissioner's Prefatory Note).
However, because of the general resistance to the provisions of the 1939 Act, a total revi-
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not in themselves necessarily prohibit apportionment of liability among
multiple tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis, '' l °° the policy underlying the rule denying contribution to intentional tortfeasors should be
examined to determine whether this old practice should be laid to rest.
The main arguments for retaining this rule were also advanced to
support the now-defunct common law rule denying apportionment of
damages between joint tortfeasors under any circumstances.101 However, when the California legislature adopted the contribution statutes,

it did provide solutions for many of the problems present under common law. These solutions would apply equally if apportionment of
damages according to fault were applied to intentional tortfeasors.
Two closely related arguments for continuing the no-contribution
rule were designed to promote rapid compensation for the plaintiff.1 2
First, there was the fear that defendants who settled rapidly would have
no guarantee of immunity from a later suit by a joint tortfeasor seeking
contribution, and that therefore tortfeasors would be reluctant to settle
and expose themselves to the possibility of double liability.0 3 However, this problem was remedied by the California statute' °4 providing
that in a negligence action, a good faith settlement10 5 reduces the plainsion was enacted in 1955. This version specifically denies contribution among intentional
tortfeasors. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § l(c) (1955 Revision).
Other states also have contribution statutes which are worded broadly enough to encompass intentional tortfeasors: Mo. STAT. ANN. § 537.060 (Vernon 1953); N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
LAw §§ 1401-1404 (McKinney 1976); Tax. Crv. STAT. art. 2212 (Vernon 1971); W. VA.
CODE § 55-7-13 (1966). See also note 20 supra.
100. 21 Cal. 3d at 328, 579 P.2d at 444, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
101. For a discussion of these arguments as applied primarily to negligent tortfeasors, see
Leflar, supra note 76, at 131-39; Note, ContributionandIndemnity in California,57 CALIF. L.
REV. 490, 499-502 (1969); Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors, 41 S.
CAL. L. REv. 728, 730-32 (1968).
102. Rapid settlement of claims was one of the goals of the 1957 California legislature
when it enacted the California contribution statutes. River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior
Ct., 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 993, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 503 (1972).
103. James, ContributionAmong Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L.
REv. 1156, 1160-61 (1941).
104. Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or
not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or
more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort--(a) It shall not
discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability unless its terms so provide, but it shall
reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it whichever is the
greater, and (b) It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
any contribution to any other tortfeasors.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West Supp. 1978).
105. The "good faith" requirement is met by a settling tortfeasor if the amount paid in
satisfaction is "within a reasonable range of the settlor's fair share." River Garden Farms,
Inc. v. Superior Ct., 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 506 (1972).
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tiff's recovery against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the settlement or a stipulated figure, 10 6 and further relieves the settling
defendant from all liability for contribution. 10 7 If liability were appor-

tioned according to fault, both settling and non-settling tortfeasors
could invoke the protection provided by this statute.10 8 Thus, an intentional tortfeasor would have no more reluctance to enter a rapid pre-

trial settlement than does a negligent tortfeasor.
A second fear was that by not allowing a plaintiff to threaten a defendant with full liability if settlement were not reached quickly, the
plaintiff's negotiating power would be diminished. 10 9 This argument

ignores the fact that joint and several liability has not been abrogated
by the Li decision;

0

the plaintiff retains his full power to bring suit

against any one joint tortfeasor for the entire damages."' Allowing
one intentional tortfeasor a cause of action against the other intentional
tortfeasor would merely allow the liable party to recover sums paid by

him for damages not caused by his fault. The plaintiff, having already
been compensated, need not be involved in this action and so would

not be unduly prejudiced or inconvenienced."t 2 Thus, the goal of rapid
plaintiff compensation could still be served while allowing damages to

be apportioned according to fault, even among intentional tortfeasors.
Another major argument supporting the present statutory scheme denying liability based on fault between intentional tortfeasors is that the
courts dislike helping a wrongdoer shift liability to another.' 1 3 However, even in the absence of legislative mandate, the courts are now

willing to determine relative fault, at least as between negligent
106. This practice was continued under the American Motorcycle scheme of partial indemnity. 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
107. The American Motorcycle court recognized the strong public policy favoring rapid
settlement and concluded that in order to continue this policy, it is necessary to discharge a
tortfeasor making a reasonable settlement in good faith from liability for partial indemnity
as well. Id
108. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 879 (West Supp. 1978) provides that the provisions of the
contribution statutes are severable. Thus, the settlement provision could be retained even if
the provision disallowing contribution among intentional tortfeasors were abolished.
109. James, ContributionAmong Joint Tort/easors:A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L.
RE. 1156, 1160-61 (1941).
110. 20 Cal. 3d at 586-91, 578 P.2d at 903-07, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186-90.
111. Id at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189. Of course, under current California
law, the named defendant can bring other parties allegedly also responsible for plaintiff's
losses into the lawsuit by way of a cross-complaint against them. Id at 607, 578 P.2d at 917,
146 Cal. Rptr. at 200. However, this ability on the part of defendants to allocate damages
does not diminish the plaintiff's power of recovery. See note 112 infra and the accompanying text.
112. 20 Cal. 3d at 606-07, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
113. Id at 592, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
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tortfeasors. This argument, therefore, has been eroded to the point that
to use this philosophy as the sole basis for continuing an inequitable
rule is highly questionable.
A closely related proposition is that the denial of judicial aid pun14
ishes past misconduct and discourages similar future misconduct.'
However, as was discussed earlier, the main goal of tort law is compensation of the plaintiff, and punitive damages are the proper vehicle for
imposing punishment. I" Furthermore, while the critics of the common
law no-contribution rule have not seriously questioned its applicability
to intentional tortfeasors, it has been observed that "there is absolutely
no factual proof that the rule operates effectively as punishment and
discouragement to wrongdoers, or that the law's attitude of dignified
aloofness serves any good purpose whatever, whether the would-be liti16
gant be a double-dyed villain, or only an ordinary imprudent man."'
Indeed, to the extent that imposing any liability acts as punishment, it
would be more consistent to "punish" all intentional tortfeasors, rather
than holding one fully liable and allowing the others to go scot-free.17
Aside from the fact that the deterrent effect of imposing full liability on
intentional tortfeasors has never been substantiated," 8 it has been
pointed out that a "sporting chance" of escaping all liability might actually increase willingness to engage in misconduct." 9 While this proposition may or may not be true, the present rule disallowing a cause of
action for equitable apportionment of damages certainly provides an
intentional tortfeasor with additional incentive to evade judicial process. If he can disappear until a co-defendant settles or is brought to
judgment and pays the obligation voluntarily or through judicial execution, he is free from any liability both to the plaintiff and the cotortfeasor.
The thought has been advanced that if multiple intentional
tortfeasors act in concert, in furtherance of a common purpose, there is
no basis upon which liability may be apportioned, because the intentional tortfeasors are equally responsible for the entire damage. 20 The
validity of this argument is questionable. The California Supreme
Court has indicated that the basis for apportioning liability is not nec114. Leflar, supra note 76, at 133.
115. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
116. Leflar, supra note 76, at 139.
117. Id at 133.
118. Id at 134; Note, The Tie That Binds Liability of Intentional Tort-Feasorsfor Extended Consequences, 14 STAN. L. REv. 362, 364-65 (1962).
119. Leflar, supra note 76, at 133-34.
120. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 314-15.
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essarily direct causation, in the physical sense, but may be based upon
fault, Le., the relative culpability of each defendant tortfeasor.' 2' Furthermore, any time joint and several liability is found, even in a pure
negligence action, each defendant tortfeasor is held fully liable for the
' 22
damage, regardless of the amount of damage he actually "caused."'
It therefore seems clear that where intentional tortfeasors are equally at
fault, each should be responsible for his pro rata share of the damages,
and that one defendant should be able to recover from the others any
sums paid in excess of that amount. Certainly this would be a more
logical solution than allowing one intentional tortfeasor to avoid all
liability and forcing the other to make full satisfaction of a judgment.
Of course, punitive damages would not be affected by allowing a
cause of action for equitable apportionment. Under the present state of
the law in California, punitive damages, if any, may be assessed against
the several defendants in differing amounts,1 23 or they may be awarded
against one or more of the defendants and not others.' 24 Since, among
other considerations, these damages are based on the degree of culpability or the existence of actual malice,2 5 such damages should remain
strictly several in effect and not a part of the compensatory liability for
which equitable apportionment can be sought.
III.

CONCLUSION

The California courts should extend comparative fault concepts to
actions involving intentional tortfeasors at the earliest opportunity.
Such an extension will be consistent with, and is made necessary by,
recent California Supreme Court decisions apportioning liability according to relative fault among all parties to negligence and strict liability cases. A failure to give intentional tortfeasors the benefit of
comparative fault principles will lead to inequitable results. Furthermore, sound social policy requires that this change in the current law
be made.
Teresa A Tracy

121. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text; Fleming, The Supreme Court of California 1974-75, Foreward"ComparativeNegligence at Last-By JudicialChoice, 64 CALIF. L.
REv.239, 249 (1976).
122. See text accompanying notes 110-12 supra.
123. Thomson v. Catalina, 205 Cal. 402, 407-08, 271 P. 198, 200-01 (1928).
124. Kim v. Chinn, 56 Cal. App. 2d 857, 860-61, 133 P.2d 677, 678-79 (1943).
125. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.

